A Mature Exercise of Sovereignty by Fortier, L. Yves
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 40, Number 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2002) Article 8
A Mature Exercise of Sovereignty
L. Yves Fortier
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information




BY L. YVES FORTIER, C.C., Q.C.'
I. INTROD U CTION ................................................ 425
II. CANADA'S DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN .................... 427
III. WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE .................................... 430
IV. THOSE DAMN YANKEES ........................................ 431
V. BACK TO THE FUTURE ......................................... 435
VI. CONCLU SION .................................................. 437
I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of this century, it is quite evident that, in many
respects, the challenges facing our country are identical to those confronted
by our predecessors; in fact, they are identical to those that have existed
throughout our history. While the events of 11 September 2001 have
certainly brought these issues into sharper focus, the challenges to which I
refer are no more acute today than at other moments in our history.
I am referring to the challenges of defining ourselves as a nation
and Canada as a sovereign state. Who are we and who are we not? What
do we stand for and what do we oppose? Who are our friends, our allies,
and our adversaries? Where does our country fit in the community of
nations? What useful role can we play on the world stage?
I hesitate in purporting to address such traditional Canadian
conundrums, lest I be taken for some sort of self-professed shaman,
dispensing answers to questions that have bedevilled Canadians for
centuries. But nothing could be further from the truth.
However, if I do, at times, sound certain of my opinions, I hope to
be excused if my remarks contain at least a certain element of "been there,
done that." As I address you today, in Toronto, unarguably the seat of
economic power in Canada and to many Qu6becers the centre of what they
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inaccurately consider a monolithic "rest of Canada" (ROC), I have a secret
to tell you: the struggle that Canada is once again experiencing-the
struggle to define and assert its identity and distinctiveness in an ever-
converging world-is a struggle that Qu6bec, I am pleased to say, has won.
Although this may be welcome news to many, it is not really a secret. The
real secret is how this occurred, and this is the matter which I propose to
address today since I believe that it holds lessons of utility to all Canadians.
In truth, the explanation is quite elementary. The answer was there
all along. Simply put, the realization gradually dawned on Qu6becers that
Qu6bec's age-old struggle was, for the most part (at least since the Quiet
Revolution), of our own making. The consequence was that, some time
during the last decade, we simply decided to rid ourselves of this self-
imposed yoke. Whereas Qu6bec traditionally defined itself as what it was
not-not English-speaking, not Protestant, not wealthy; in two words: not
Canada-it came to consider its distinctiveness as self-evident and to view
its identity in terms of its positive attributes, befitting a modern, open, and
sophisticated society.
Even today, it is no coincidence that the old and tired purveyors of
separatism in Qu6bec continue to harp on what they contend Qu6bec is
not-essentially, "not the ROC"-in order to peddle their snake oil. The
vast majority of Qu6becers, however, could hardly care less. They no longer
seek self-worth by staring out the window at the rest of the world; they find
it by looking in the mirror and seeing who they are and what they have
achieved. Interestingly, as Qu6bec has matured as a society, Qu6becers
have lost the need to insist on their "difference." They no longer view
separation-the ultimate political statement of "what we are not"-as an
element of self-expression and autonomy.
It is from this perspective that I have recently pondered the curious
issue of Canadian sovereignty; curious in that it is an issue at all, let alone
one which has resurfaced with such force since 11 September 2001. Why is
it, for example, that Qu6bec, especially the so-called sovereigntists, can
unequivocally embrace the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), while many inhabitants of the large and powerful ROC continue
to have doubts regarding what they see as the loss of sovereignty inherent
in such international arrangements? Why is it that so many Canadians
imagine threats to our sovereignty lurking behind so many corners? What
is it about our sense of self, in particular vis.-A-vis the United States, that
prompts such reactions and that has brought the issue of "continentalism"'
to the forefront of national debate?
By "continentalism" I mean, broadly speaking, the harmonization of policies between Canada
and the United States.
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II. CANADA'S DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
One recent example of what I have chosen to call the continentalist
debate was then Defence Minister Art Eggleton's January 2002
announcement of Canada's decision to send 750 ground troops to assist the
U.S. effort to root out and destroy the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces in the southern areas of Afghanistan.2 For several weeks prior, the
Canadian government had been considering the deployment of our troops
in a more traditional peacekeeping role under the leadership of the United
Nations.3 This is the sort of role that Canada has relished typically; a role
that I and many others would attribute as having been practically invented
by Lester Pearson at the time of the Suez crisis4 and that has brought our
country both admiration and respect within the international community.
Two factors appear to have determined the matter. Minister
Eggleton said that "European politics" effectively left little room for a
meaningful Canadian presence among the seventeen countries committed
to the U.N. operation being coordinated by the British.' More importantly,
and of more lasting significance I would argue, was Canada's desire to play,
and to be perceived as playing, a more direct military role in Afghanistan.
In the circumstances, the government decided that, given a choice between
a minor role in a multilateral U.N. operation and a more robust combat
contribution to the U.S. war effort, Canada's interests were better served
by working with the Americans. This decision put meat on the bones of the
Prime Minister's declaration, six days after the September 11 attacks, that
2 Daniel Leblanc & Jill Mahoney, "Canada Opts for Combat Role" The Globe and Mail (8 January
2002) Al. In March, the Defence Minister announced that 130 additional soldiers would be deployed
to the region; see "Canada to Send More Ground Troops to Afghanistan," online: D-Net
<http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/marO2/Olgroundtroops_ne.htm>. However, the Defence
Minister announced, on 21 May 2002, that the 850 soldiers sent to Afghanistan would be returning in
late July and that Canada would not be sending replacement troops. See e.g. Robert Fife, "Princess Pats
to Return in Summer" The National Post (22 May 2002) A]; Jeff Sallot, "Ottawa Takes Fire for Ending
Mission" The Globe and Mail (22 May 2002) Al; and "3 PPCLI Troops Coming Home This Summer,"
online: D-Net <http://www.dnd.ca/menu/featurestory/2002/mayO2/29may2_f-e.htm>.
3 Shawn McCarthy, "Pulled Ever Deeper into U.S. Orbit" The Globe and Mail (8 January 2002)
A6.
4See generally John Robinson Beal, The Pearson Phenomenon (Toronto: Longmans Canada,
1964) c. 8; Norman Hillmer, ed., Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1999) at 26-27, 162; Geoffrey A.H. Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993) c. 9-10; and John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of
Lester Pearson, vol. 2 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1992) c. 4.
5 Leblanc & Mahoney, supra note 2 at Al.
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"we are at war against terrorism. '
The import of Canada's decision was immediately noted by both
supporters and critics. For the first time, Canadian ground forces would be
operating under unilateral U.S. operational control-that is, under the U.S.
flag but without the support of the U.N. or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)'-although the U.S. action was sanctioned as self-
defence by the U.N. Security Council shortly after September 11.8
Canadians had previously operated under American command, on land, at
sea, and in the air; however, Canada's ground forces had never done so on
a direct bilateral basis. All previous Canadian deployments of ground
forces, either alongside Americans or under American command, had
occurred within the context of NATO operations, such as in the Balkan
conflicts, or as part of a multilateral coalition formed for specific purposes,
such as the 1991 Gulf War.9 Even during the Korean War, the U.N. flag
flew over the anticommunist alliance of which Canada was a member. In
short, this was the first time in our history as a fully sovereign nation that
Canadian ground forces would gird for battle under the banner of the
United States or, I believe, under the flag of any state other than Canada.
As political and military observers remarked, Canada's decision to send its
army where its navy and airforce had gone before was especially significant
because, despite the sophistication of military hardware, "ground troops
remain the essential element in warfare, and because the army is by far the
Canadian Forces' largest branch."'"
Notwithstanding the groundbreaking nature of the government's
decision, the deployment of Canada's army harked back to what has been
referred to as "an honourable Canadian tradition."'" In fact, it resurrected
a dilemma at least a century old. I will return to this historical context since
I believe that it is only by attempting to understand current events through
a historical lens that we can learn from history rather than blindly repeat it.
However, I will first consider the primary argument articulated by
6 House of Commons Debates, 79 (17 September 2001) (Right Hon. J. Chr6tien), online:
Parliament of Canada Homepage <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/parlbus/chambus/
house/debates/079_2001-09-17/toc079-E.htm>.
7 Leblanc & Mahoney, supra note 2 at A6.
8,,Security Council Condemns, 'In Strongest Terms', Terrorist Attacks On United States," online:
United Nations Homepage <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>.
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opponents of Canada's decision to deploy its troops in Afghanistan.
The principal concern, as I understand it, was that the ramifications
of the government's decision extended far beyond the battlefield and
effectively put Canadian sovereignty at risk. The point was well and
succinctly made by Canada's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd
Axworthy, on the same day that the troop deployment decision was
announced. In remarks widely published in the media, Mr. Axworthy
condemned the decision as "regrettable" and suggested that Canada was
increasingly "spinning firmly in the U.S. orbit. 1 2 He believed that this
would undermine our country's role as an "independent operator."' 3
Referring more broadly to what he considered the ill-fated effort to
harmonize Canada's security policies with those of the United States in the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mr. Axworthy stated, "The
only test is how high we jump."' 4
In pith and substance, this concern lies at the heart of the debate
regarding what I previously referred to as continentalism in all its many and
varied manifestations.
I cannot, in good conscience, end this brief discussion of the issues
raised by Canada's deployment in Afghanistan without referring to the
views on the subject expressed by retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie,
another eminent Canadian. I consider Major-General MacKenzie's
observations particularly relevant because, whether or not they are
accurate, and whether or not they are shared by all Canadians, they too
reflect and can be said to represent the views of many in this country.
General MacKenzie applauded the government's decision. In
typical, engaging fashion, he said that joint operations with the United
States in and around Kandahar would be more meaningful than-in his
words-"directing traffic in Kabul" under the U.N. flag. 5 I believe it is
significant that this conclusion (though it was likely framed in different
language), was clearly shared by Canada's current military leaders. Indeed,
the decision to engage in a joint operation with the United States, with a
full battalion deployed as an intact unit under Canadian command but
overall U.S. operational control, appears not only to have been a political
decision but was favoured as well by senior military commanders, most
importantly, General Ray H6nault, Chief of Canada's Armed Forces.
6




16 Leblanc & Mahoney, supra note 2 at A6.
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III. WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE
Since, as Shakespeare tells us, "what's past is prologue,'
7
Canadians would be remiss if, in the context of the current debate on
continentalism, we did not consider previous incarnations of the issue.
That continentalism has become a hot-button issue is undeniable,
and was likely unavoidable in the aftermath of September 11. When the
then Leader of the Opposition, Stockwell Day, opened Parliament's
question period on 3 October 2001 saying: "It is now day 22," his audience
knew what he meant. "Day 22" obviously meant twenty-two days after
September 11. t8 Indeed, in many respects, our current national debates
concerning a wide range of both domestic and international issues date
from, and are conditioned by, that horrific day. In fact, however, many of
the issues with which we currently grapple have existed since the beginning
of "this experiment called Canada."' 9 Through the National Energy
Program in the early 1980s, cruise missile testing in the mid-1980s, and two
rounds of free trade in the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerns regarding
the twin issues of continentalism and Canadian sovereignty have ruled the
day.
History even sheds light, and offers perhaps a lesson or two, on the
current deployment of Canadian forces in Afghanistan: "One hundred
years ago, Canadian troops, including the Strathconas, elements of which
are today in Afghanistan, were fighting beside British troops and under
British command during the Boer War."2 As scholars Barry Cooper and
David Bercuson have written, Canadians took part in that military initiative
because the government of the day, under Wilfrid Laurier, was intent on
increasing Canada's influence within the British empire.2' At the time,
Great Britain was "the sun around which Canada revolved," though there
was considerable uncertainty expressed in this country regarding "how far
from that sun [Canada] should orbit."2 Substitute "the United States" for
"Great Britain" and, in a nutshell, you have the dilemma facing Canada
today.
17William Shakespeare, The Tempest at I, i, 247.
18 House of Commons Debates, 91 (3 October 2001) (S. Day), online: Parliament of Canada
Homepage <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/t/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/091-2001-10-03/tO9l9 -
E.htm>.
19 Roy MacGregor, "Continentalism is Back" The National Post (4 October 2001) A6.
20 Cooper & Bercuson, supra note 9.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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The great debate regarding Canadian sovereignty during the first
third of the twentieth century reflected two contrary points of view, one of
which was reflected in Laurier's policies. He and his Tory successor, Robert
Borden, maintained that Canada would gain autonomy and influence as a
nation through full and active participation in Imperial affairs; indeed,
Borden is credited with ensuring "a significant Canadian presence at the
post-World War I peace table as a result of this country's contributions and
sacrifices on the Western front during that conflict." 3 Another policy
which was effective, as the Statute of Westminster eloquently testifies, was
the "opposing viewpoint, championed by William Lyon Mackenzie King,
[which] held that Canada could only gain the autonomy it sought by
keeping its distance from Britain and especially from Imperial defence
planning. ,24
It should be acknowledged that these contradictory policies, each
of which was successful in its day, were of course products of two radically
divergent sets of circumstances: war and peace. Clearly, each was
appropriate to the particular context within which it arose.
The power of the United States today is arguably even greater than
that of Great Britain a century ago, but the dilemma for Canada remains
largely as it was then.25 Although the centre of our solar system may have
shifted, the question remains as to "the optimal radius of the Canadian
orbit around the [new] American sun. 26 Canada's actions in response to
the shameful attacks of September 11, and the collective soul-searching
engendered both by the attacks and by our government's reaction,
poignantly illustrate the durability and complexity of this dilemma.
IV. THOSE DAMN YANKEES
It occurs to me, not for the first time, that Canadians are uniquely
prone to identity crises. Perhaps alone among the peoples of the world, it
sometimes seems as though we are never happier than in the throes of
debate concerning our sovereignty, our unity, our values: in a word, our
identity, especially as it relates to the United States.
Indeed, the United States exerts a strong and unavoidable pull, and
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less frightened by the idea of a closer relationship with our southern
neighbour than many politicians within the current and previous Liberal
governments: "Over the past five years, the government has floated a
number of ideas, including a common currency, a customs union, even
water sales and common energy policy." 8 In almost every instance,
however, the mere utterance of such continentalist ideas was followed by
qualification, denial, and inevitably, little or no meaningful change.29
I would like to clarify that I am not here today to advocate such
change. Nor do I believe that continentalist policies-policies harmonized
with those of the United States-are required or appropriate in all cases.
What I do deplore is the almost reflexive gnashing of teeth and rending of
garments that often follow the merest suggestion of closer links with our
American cousins. Why? Because such reactions serve only to stifle debate
regarding the very matters which the so-called Canadian nationalists, self-
titled defenders of our country, purport to defend; that is, our identity as
Canadians, and the values and policies that we espouse.
Anti-Americanism only clouds the issues that its proponents claim
to resolve. Poll after poll demonstrates that "Canadians have no desire to
become Americans, and Americans certainly have no aspirations to digest
Canada."3° As Stephen Handelman pointed out in a recent article,
Canada's immigration policy may be shifting to meet American post-
September 11 concerns. However, even U.S. officials acknowledge that "no
one is talking about erasing the border or setting up a customs union. For
a very good reason: the U.S. is wary of [an] erosion of sovereignty, too."31
That observation is extremely insightful and, I submit, particularly well
worth bearing in mind at this time of heightened sensitivity to the issue of
relations with the United States. The fact is that we are not alone in our
desire to preserve our sovereignty. This simple fact itself suggests that we
have less to fear from our southern neighbour than many people imagine.
Historians Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer recently
addressed the question: "Why does rabid anti-Americanism stir some
Canadians so deeply?"3 Their article was a timely response to the view-to
my mind, obscene-expressed by some people in Canada, to the effect that




31Stephen Handelman, "A Mighty Fine Line" Time 158:21 (12 November 2001) 27.
32 Jack L. Granatstein & Norman Hillmer, "Those Damn Yankees" Maclean's 114:43 (22 October
2001) 58 at 58.
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foreseeable retribution, for U.S. actions abroad. Granatstein and Hillmer
noted that what they call the "hardy perennial of Canadian anti-
Americanism" returned in full flower this past September, even as
Americans were grieving their losses.33
Granatstein and Hillmer's conclusion, with which I strongly agree,
was that, "[alt its best, anti-Americanism is a defence mechanism for
Canadians who want to remain independent in an integrated North
America. At its worst, it is bias and prejudice, fuelled by envy, hatred, and
a naive view of the world."34 I would add that, in my opinion, anti-
Americanism is but a reflection of what I have called our propensity for
identity crises. To be fair, it may only be natural both that the question
"who are we?" and the temptation to answer that question by loudly
proclaiming "who are we not" should arise with some frequency given our
proximity and ties to the United States. However, in the final analysis, the
task of defining ourselves and our country is ours alone. We must look
inward to answer the question "who are we?" for that is the essence of
autonomy. Similarities with the United States are not a threat to that
autonomy, but part of who we are. Being different from the Americans (or
anyone else) is in no way an affirmation of sovereignty. Ultimately, "[d]oing
what is right by us" is a mature exercise of sovereignty.35
Most Canadians are in fact at peace with their southern cousins.
They live contentedly as a part of North America. If we seem at times
consumed by a struggle to remain distinct from the United States, it is only
because "our similarities greatly outweigh our differences, starting with our
common embrace of such values as freedom, tolerance, democracy, and
order."36 From September 11 to the present day, polls have demonstrated
that most Canadians support the United States in its war against
terrorism; 37 they should, because it is our common values of "pluralism,
secularism, and democracy that are under attack., 38 Canada is as
threatened by terrorism as the United States, and is equally threatened by
the social, political, and economic instability that terrorism, if unchecked,
can cause.
I would go further. Permit me to share with you some of the
33 Ibid. at 59.
34 Ibid.
35 Edward Greenspon, "Debunking the Myths About Post-Sept. I I Canada" The Globe and Mail
(2 October 2001) A17.
36 Ibid.
37 Granatstein & Hillmer, supra note 32 at 59.
38 Ibid.
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emotions I experienced on 11 September 2001 and during the days which
followed. Of horror I need not speak; all of us, I know, experienced the
same emotion. Horror with respect to the depravity of the individuals
responsible, the scope of the disaster and the scale of human life taken.
"There but for the grace of God go I" is a thought that perhaps also
occurred to many people and I believe that that realization is important,
both for individuals and for states not directly targeted by the perpetrators
of the attacks. However, more fundamentally, I could not but feel on
September 11 that the souls who perished on that day did so, in part, for
me. They did so because they were-but by no means
exclusively-Americans. They were targeted for no other reason than that
they were citizens of a nation envied and despised by the attackers. A
nation whose founding principles most of us cherish for ourselves. A nation
whose power and might-economic, technological, and military-is
essential to maintaining the existence that much of the world, including
ourselves, lives on a daily basis.
It occurred to me on September 11 that we owe, to some degree,
quite a bit to the United States. This includes the flow of oil from the
Persian Gulf, the maintenance of stability in various regions of the globe,
the economy in which many of our goods and services are sold, and even
the overwhelming military force under whose umbrella we have long been
sheltered, enabling us to direct governmental and societal priorities and
spending elsewhere. Did we ever believe that these boons to our well-being
were truly of our own making exclusively, or that they were the product of
natural forces independent of human intervention? Did we ever believe
that our prosperity was cost- or risk-free? What are those costs? How are
they allocated among the beneficiaries-including ourselves-of peace,
prosperity, and growth? Do we fully realize that, though we are different,
though we are not Americans, though our values and policies are not
identical, we too, among other nations, rely upon and benefit from many of
the policies and actions of the United States, including certain of the very
policies and actions stated by the September 11 terrorists as the reasons for
their attacks? It is no coincidence that the target of the attacks was not the
headquarters of the Department of National Defence in Ottawa, nor the
Kremlin or the Forbidden City, nor even the Petronas Towers in Kuala
Lumpur, but rather the symbols of American military and economic
supremacy.
Questions such as these arose and swirled within my mind on
September 11, even as the horror of the attacks were felt in my gut. While
the answers remain inchoate intellectually, I could not and cannot escape
the feeling that, in some measure, the victims of September 11 were
targeted precisely because they represented a system of beliefs, values,
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finance, industry, politics, and economics that underlies our existence as
Canadians today.
In Faust, Goethe wrote: "Freedom and existence are earned by
those alone who conquer them each day anew."39 The events of 11
September 2001 have caused us to re-examine our freedom and existence,
and have challenged us to conquer them anew. Broadly speaking, the
challenge is twofold. On the one hand, we are challenged actively to
participate in the defence, by force if necessary, of the freedom and
existence that we have chosen for ourselves. At the same time, it is equally
necessary for us to consider whether other proactive measures are
appropriate to further that freedom and existence.
In my opinion, the decision to send our troops into battle alongside
Americans and under American control is an example of the first of these
challenges successfully, if belatedly, met. Far from constituting a sacrifice
of sovereignty, it demonstrates a mature and clear-sighted appreciation of
how we can best assist an operation that is fundamentally in our interest.
As a Canadian, I am not ashamed to defend a friend, and I am certainly not
ashamed to assist a friend whose actions, even if imperfect, benefit my
fellow citizens.
It is the second of the broad challenges which I have identified that
is, curiously, the more daunting; that is, a consideration of the many issues
that arise under the rubric of continentalism. As I have attempted to
demonstrate, these questions did not arise for the first time on 11
September 2001 but there is no doubt that they have come into sharper
focus since.
V. BACK TO THE FUTURE
What are the issues of the day? Almost every media outlet reveals
the same concerns-security, immigration, economic integration, our
currency -to name but a few. In other words, the meat and potatoes of the
continentalist debate. Plus qa change, plus c'est la m~me chose.
I believe that the issue of continentalism will come to be seen as the
defining issue of this government, and likely the next several. It lies at the
heart of both security and prosperity, two perennial concerns generally
recognized as involving transnational, in particular American, factors. Yet,
as has been pointed out recently, it also affects a range of secondary issues
3 9 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Doubleday, 1961)
at 11, V, 11575-76.
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"from handguns to health care." 40
It is impossible to foresee precisely what directions Canada will
choose to take in respect of all of the issues raised by this age-old debate.
However, the reality is that Canada has always been involved in a
"necessary dance, 41 with America, which must be clearly and broadly
acknowledged if we intend to do more than merely follow the United
States' lead. This reality is nothing new. What is perhaps unique is the
mood of most Canadians since September 11 and the profound
sentiment-in many circles, warmth and compassion-toward our lifelong
"dance partner." This mood must be acknowledged, understood, and
channelled by our government, to productive end. This, I believe, is the
great challenge facing us at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Our
current government continues to enjoy unprecedented support from the
citizens of this country. In my opinion, since there is little risk of seeing
power wrested from the Liberal Party, this government and this prime
minister have a golden opportunity to engage Canadians in a forthright
discussion, to facilitate a debate that transcends purely political rhetoric,
and to spell out with boldness and creativity a vision of the Canada-U.S.
relationship.
Clearly I am not alone in this opinion. On 10 January 2002, it was
announced that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade was preparing to begin hearings regarding "the future
of Canada-U.S. relations that will review everything from adopting the U.S.
dollar to the unified customs regime. ... The hearings will see the first
comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of the issue of North American
economic integration since Jean Chr6tien came to power in 1993.,,42 It
remains to be seen whether this committee will in fact become a forum for
discussion of such critical issues, let alone result in a meaningful report to
which the government will respond with concrete measures. 3 Its unofficial
agenda is nothing if not ambitious. It includes "dollarization" and economic
integration more generally, as well as what its former Chairman Bill
Graham (now Minister of Foreign Affairs) calls the "institutional
framework" of our relationship with the United States and the need to
move beyond what he sees as the "ad hoc basis" on which the relationship
40 MacGregor, supra note 19.
41 Ibid.
42 Ian Jack, "MPs Forcing PM's Hand on Dollar" The National Post (10 January 2002) Al.
43 The Committee's final report on the North American Relations study will be tabled in autumn
2002. See "North American Relationship Study," online: House of Commons Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Homepage <http://www.parl.gc.ca/lnfoCom/
CommitteeMain.asp? Language= E&CommitteelD = 143&Joint =0>.
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is managed." I say: from the chairman's mouth to the prime minister's ears.
Whatever the outcome, I heartily applaud the fundamental objective
articulated by Mr. Graham: to "enable a debate. ''45
John Manley, currently Minister of Finance, emphasized early on
during his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister that he views the United
States as Canada's most important partner at many levels. That view was
reiterated in December 2001: "We often in Canada focus on our
differences with the United States. Those differences are far less significant
than the similarities we have in values and objectives and respect for human
rights and basic freedoms. We're usually on the same side of global
issues.
' 4 6
On the question of continental defence, specifically the potential
expansion of the Northern American Aerospace Defence Command
(NORAD), and on the question of sovereignty that arises in any such joint
security initiative, Mr. Manley stated: "We don't see it as a cessation of
sovereignty. We see it as joint sovereignty operating in a functional way, in
a desirable way., 47 In my mind, that is the essence of a mature exercise of
sovereignty. Sharing resources. Pooling sovereignty. And doing so because
we have determined that it is best for us to do so. What is any treaty or
multilateral convention but a partial compromise of otherwise unfettered
autonomy? What is any multilateral organization but a pooling of resources
or sovereignty? I submit that the crux of the issue is less the lofty issue of
sovereigntyperse than the more mundane matter of which "dance partner"
to choose. To my mind, rather than bemoan our fate as neighbour, special
friend, and ally of the United States, we should attempt to acknowledge
honestly both the rewards and the challenges of the relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Qu6becers have discovered, as I submit they have, that their
distinctiveness is a given and that their identity lies not in who they are not
but in who they are, there is surely no reason why Canada should do no less.
We can deal with Americans in the same way we deal with Russians,
Chinese, Angolans, and Indians-as equals, without feeling threatened. We
can enact policies that make sense for us, without feeling threatened by a
44 Jack, supra note 42, at A6.
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Ibd. at Al.
46 Mike Tricky, "Canadians Get More Credit Than We Merit: Manley" The [Montreal] Gazette
(26 December 2001) A8.
47 Ibid.
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loss of sovereignty. The United States does not wish to colonize us any
more than we wish to be colonized. We can acknowledge that our fears are
often of our own creation without losing sight of what makes us Canadian.
We can recognize similarities, and act on them in concert with the United
States and other nations, without succumbing to guilt-racked soul-
searching. We can be who we are without constantly questioning ourselves.
We are a noble nation, born in peace, forged in war, and the envy
of much of the world. If we begin to realize just how true this is and cease
demonizing the United States, we will finally merit fully the reputation and
the laurels that we have struggled so hard to attain and that have been
bestowed upon us. We can learn from the experience of "les quibicois
canadiens": it is indeed possible to define ourselves, recognize our identity,
preserve our autonomy, and assert our sovereignty, both on this continent
and others, even as we acknowledge and strengthen the ties that bind us to
countries which hold dear the values that we call our own.
In his "Speech on Conciliation with America" on 22 March 1775,
the great English political thinker Edmund Burke declared: "Abstract
Liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found."48 The lesson
remains important today. The principles that define us mean nothing in the
abstract: what counts is the manner in which they are exercised. Specifically,
it is the exercise of sovereignty which renders the concept meaningful. And
it is a mature exercise of sovereignty which characterizes a modern, self-
assured nation.
It is time for Canadians to start looking in the mirror, rather than
out the window, to know who we are. There is no need for us to demonize
others, and no need to extol differences or fear similarities, as a basis of
self-definition. There is no need to guard with obsessive jealously what is
indubitably and permanently ours: our identity and our sovereignty. As a
mature nation, it behooves us to conduct ourselves accordingly: to
acknowledge both the similarities and differences between us and our
neighbours; to embrace rather than eschew alliances-be they military,
economic, or political-which further our own goals; to stand confidently,
not timidly, beside our friends in their time of need; and to recognize that
we do so precisely because Canada is an autonomous, sovereign nation that
acts in accordance with its fundamental values.
48 Paul Langford, The Writings and Speeches of Edmund B&irke, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996) at 120.
